Vaccination yields a direct effect by reducing infection but also has an indirect effect, herd immunity: If many individuals are vaccinated, the immune population will protect unvaccinated individuals (social benefit). However, due to a vaccination's individual costs and risks, individual incentives to free-ride on others' protection also increases with the number of individuals who are already vaccinated (individual benefit).
Game-Theoretical Reflections on Communicating Herd Immunity in Vaccine Advocacy
Vaccination is typically treated as an individual decision making task. In addition to motivational factors such as adherence to social norms (Brown et al., 2011; Liao, Cowling, Lam & Fielding, 2011; Sturm, Mays & Zimet, 2005; Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) , a vaccination's (perceived) individual costs and benefits are especially predicative of vaccination intention. This is proposed by several theoretical models of preventive health behavior (for an overview see Weinstein, 1993) and has been confirmed by empirical work (e.g. Brewer & Fazekas, 2007; Nguyen, Henningsen, Brehaut, Hoe & Wilson, 2011) . Costs (barriers) of vaccination can be monetary and non-monetary, such as the time needed to obtain a vaccination, but also include the risks associated with vaccination such as the occurrence of vaccine-adverse events. Benefits of vaccination vary according to the vaccine's effectiveness as well as the likelihood and severity of the disease the vaccine protects against.
Vaccination yields a direct effect by reducing infection. Moreover, vaccination against contagious diseases has an additional indirect effect (Fine, Eames & Heyman, 2011) : The transmission of a disease is reduced with an increasing number of vaccinated individuals. An indirect effect of vaccination can have two major implications: On the one hand, each vaccination reduces the transmission of an infection in the population (Anderson & May, 1991) , which protects other susceptible individuals (for instance, those who are too young to vaccinate or immunocompromised). With a critical vaccination level, herd immunity and disease eradication can be reached (e.g. 95% vaccine coverage will allow for eradication of the measles in Europe; Christie & Gay, 2011; Smith, 1970) . Hence, vaccination yields a social benefit, as vaccine coverage above the critical level is optimal from the collective perspective. On the other COMMUNICATING HERD IMMUNITY IN VACCINE ADVOCACY 4 hand, if everyone else is directly protected by vaccination, free-riders (or free-loaders; see Fine et al., 2011) can benefit from the indirect effects of vaccination and henceforth avoid individual costs of vaccination (e.g. money, time, vaccine-adverse events, inconvenience). The indirect effect of vaccination, therefore, also yields an individual benefit. The presence and awareness of both individual and social benefit from herd immunity result in a mixed-motive situation that renders vaccination a strategic interaction (Schelling, 1960) . As high vaccination uptake is of major importance for society in order to reach public health goals, it is a fundamental question how societies can increase vaccination uptake.
This contribution investigates how the communication of herd immunity may affect vaccination uptake. More precisely, we examine how the awareness of a vaccination's individual benefit, social benefit, or both affects vaccination intention. According to the theory of reasoned action and the theory of planned behavior, salient beliefs determine an individual's attitude towards a behavior and behavioral intentions (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980 ). An individual's awareness of herd immunity may therefore either increase or decrease vaccination uptake, depending on the salience of individual and social benefits that result from the indirect protection of herd immunity.
Vaccination as a strategic interaction
The interactive structure of vaccination decisions has recently been discussed in the literature (e.g. Bauch & Earn, 2004; Bhattacharyya & Bauch, 2010; Galvani, Reluga, & Chapman, 2007; Manfredi et al., 2010) . Based on this literature we devise a simple model of vaccination as strategic interaction which is illustrated in Figure 1 . Consequently, small differences in expected costs of the disease and vaccination yield larger differences in the expected utility of vaccination and non-
. Furthermore, the probability of contracting a contagious disease, and therefore also the expected costs of the disease, over-proportionally decreases as a function of the number of vaccinated individuals, because the lifetime incidence for unvaccinated individuals decreases (e.g., Fine et al., 2011) . At the same time, the expected costs of the vaccination remain constant, since, for instance, the probability and severity of sideeffects is not affected by the number of vaccinated individuals. Therefore, when the number of vaccinated individuals (vaccine coverage) increases, the expected costs of the vaccination will at some point exceed the expected costs of the disease (E[c D ] -E[c V ] < 0; cf. intersection in Figure   1 ; Chen, 1999) . From an individual perspective, non-vaccination then becomes the best response as EU V < EU ¬ V . In contrast, it is collectively optimal to vaccinate until a vaccination level is achieved that eradicates the disease, as the expected cumulative incidence is zero if coverage is It is important to note that expected costs are subjective variables and can therefore deviate from objective cost parameters. Today, wild forms of severe vaccine-preventable diseases are rare and most individuals lack a concrete, vivid representation of the disease (= low perceived costs of disease). At the same time, vaccination costs are more visible, vivid and tangible due to high vaccination rates and immediate effort and inconvenience (= high costs of vaccination; Chen, 1999) . Many modern vaccination decisions (e.g. against polio or the measles) can therefore be framed as a social dilemma.
As discussed, herd immunity can have two potential effects. On the one hand, if the individual benefit of herd immunity is communicated, the individual's selfish/egoistic preferences might be activated (Dawes, 1980; Hardin, 1968) and accordingly affect behavior (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) . Therefore, the first hypothesis predicts:
H1. If the individual benefit of herd immunity is salient (but not the social benefit), participants will show lower vaccination intentions compared to when the individual benefit is not salient (free-riding hypothesis).
On the other hand, by making the social benefit of one's own vaccination salient, individuals' positive, other-regarding preferences might be activated (for an overview see Fehr & Schmidt, 2006) . This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2. If the social benefit of herd immunity is salient (but not the individual benefit), participants will show higher vaccination intentions compared to when the social benefit is not salient (prosocial behavior hypothesis).
This study extends prior work (e.g., Hershey, Asch, Thumasathit, Meszaros & Waters, 1994; Shim, Chapman, Townsend, & Galvani, 2012) by orthogonally manipulating the salience COMMUNICATING HERD IMMUNITY IN VACCINE ADVOCACY 7 of individual and social benefits. We are, therefore, also able to explore the interaction between the salience of individual and social benefits.
In Figure 1 , if the expected costs of vaccination increase or decrease (grey dashed line moves up or down, respectively), ceteris paribus, the intersection of E[c D ] = E[c V ] shifts further to the left or right, respectively. Consequently, the difference in expected utility between vaccination and non-vaccination on the right-hand side of this intersection increases or decreases, respectively. This effect occurs due to the indirect effect of vaccination. If individuals are unaware of this indirect effect (e.g. because herd immunity is not communicated), the expected costs of the disease will not depend on the vaccination of others and will therefore be constant. As, in this case, the solid grey line would be parallel to the dashed grey line, selfish or other-regarding preferences should thus have no effect.
The (perceived) costs of vaccination should therefore interact with the effects of communicated herd immunity: Free-riding entails the benefits of vaccination (due to others' immunization) without carrying the costs. It follows that the incentives for free-riding are especially high if costs to vaccinate are high. Likewise, individuals who vaccinate due to a prosocial motivation (to protect the unimmune) take over costs for the society. Hence, if these costs are high, prosocial behavior may be less likely. This leads to our third hypothesis, which integrates the structurally equivalent sub-hypotheses of individual and social benefit salience:
H3. If the individual benefit of herd immunity is salient, participants are more inclined to free-ride when the costs of vaccination are high than when the costs of vaccination are low. Similarly, if the social benefit of herd immunity is salient, participants are more inclined to prosocial behavior when the costs of vaccination are low than when the costs of vaccination are high (vaccination costs interaction hypothesis).
COMMUNICATING HERD IMMUNITY IN VACCINE ADVOCACY 8

Experiment
The hypotheses were tested in an online experiment that assessed vaccination intentions regarding hypothetical diseases (for a similar methodological approach, see cf. Betsch & Sachse, 2012; Betsch, Renkewitz, & Haase, in press; Betsch, Ulshöfer, Renkewitz, & Betsch, 2011; . The definition of herd immunity was provided along with one sentence summarizing the gist of the message (Reyna, 2012) , making salient either the individual benefit, social benefit, or both. A control group received no information about herd immunity. Additionally, we tested if the cost of getting vaccinated, operationalized as the amount of effort required to obtain the vaccine, interacts with the communicated benefits.
Method
Participants and design. Participants were recruited via mailing lists and social network websites (e.g. Facebook). As compensation, all participants took part in a raffle for one of five gift certificates (25 Euro; ~ $ 31). N = 371 participants completed the questionnaire. 29 participants were excluded from the sample due to excessively long (> 30 min) or short (< 5 min) duration of participation, resulting in a mean duration of 12.76 minutes (SD = 5.14).
Hence, the final sample consisted of 342 participants, both students and non-students. Eightyeight percent of the sample had an Abitur (German University entrance diploma) or higher level of education. The mean age of the sample was 30.34 years (SD = 12.5); 221 (64%) participants were female.
The experiment used a 2 × 2 × 2 between-subject design with individual benefit of herd immunity (communicated vs. not communicated), social benefit of herd immunity (communicated vs. not communicated), and costs of vaccination (low vs. high) as factors. It was COMMUNICATING HERD IMMUNITY IN VACCINE ADVOCACY 9 realized with an online software program (EFS survey), which randomly allocated participants to the eight conditions. Herd immunity. In the control condition (individual and social benefits of herd immunity were not communicated), participants received no information about herd immunity.
In the remaining three conditions, participants received the following definition of herd immunity: "Herd immunity denotes the effect that occurs when acquired immunity against a pathogen, generated through infection or vaccination, within a population (the "herd") has reached such a level that non-immune individuals in this population are also protected, because the pathogen can no longer be transmitted". Furthermore, depending on condition, one additional sentence summarized the gist of the message, manipulating the salience of the individual benefit, social benefit, or both. Individual benefit was highlighted by the sentence "The more people are vaccinated in your environment, the more likely you are protected without vaccination". Social benefit was highlighted by the sentence "If you get vaccinated, then you can protect others who are not vaccinated".
Vaccination costs. Participants were either informed that they could get vaccinated immediately (low cost) or that they would have to set up an appointment with the local hospital and that this appointment would take almost three hours (high cost). Procedure. After giving informed consent, participants were informed that all presented information is fictitious. The questionnaire began with the measurement of demographic characteristics. They were then asked to imagine a fictitious scenario: During a routine physical examination, the general practitioner informs them about the severe infectious disease
Cornicoviszidosis. This recently discovered illness had been diagnosed increasingly often. The participants received additional information about the origin of Cornicoviszidosis, the name of the responsible virus (Cornicovi), the path of infection (smear infection), and the symptoms of the disease (severe vomiting and diarrhea, severe dehydration, and high fever). Participants received a data sheet for a fictional vaccine termed Macentat containing information about vaccine-adverse events: hypersensitivity reaction of the skin with probability p = .1; headache, p = .0001 to .001; vomiting, vertigo, and skin rash with a probability less than .0001. Information about herd immunity was displayed afterwards. Before participants indicated their intention to get vaccinated, they were informed about the costs of the vaccination. Finally, the manipulation checks were recorded and participants fully debriefed.
Results
We present eta-squared as an effect size indicator along with all statistically significant results. All non-significant comparisons have an F < 1 if not stated otherwise. lower vaccination intentions when the individual benefit is salient (free-riding hypothesis), and higher vaccination intentions when the social benefit is salient (prosocial behavior hypothesis).
H3 suggests an interaction between benefit salience and costs.
To test the hypotheses, we conducted a 2 × 2 × 2 analysis of variance with vaccination others' indirect protection. When the social benefit of herd immunity was communicated, however, there was no such difference, regardless of whether the individual benefit was additionally communicated.
2
In general, vaccination intentions were lower when vaccination costs were high than when they were low, M high = 3.83, SD = 1.87; M low = 4.10, SD = 1.79; F(1, 334) = 4.57, p = .033, η 2 = .013. As expected, vaccination costs interacted with the social benefit communication,
F(1, 334) = 7.43, p = .007, η 2 = .021. As Figure 2B shows, when the social benefit of herd immunity was communicated, vaccination intentions were higher when costs were low than when costs were high, F(1, 163) = 11.07, Bonferroni-corrected p = .002, η 2 = .064, indicating conditional prosocial vaccination behavior. There was no such difference when social benefit was not salient. However, vaccination intentions under individual benefit salience did not differ between the low vs. high cost conditions. Taken together, results partially confirm the vaccination costs interaction hypothesis (H3). The three-way interaction was not significant, F < 1.6, ns.
Discussion
The goal of this paper was to assess if and how the communication of herd immunity may affect vaccination uptake. We devised a simple theoretical model of (non-)vaccination utility as a function of the perceived costs of the disease and the vaccination contingent on the number of vaccinated individuals in the population. Furthermore, some of the model's implications were tested in an experiment. The data shows that communicating the concept of herd immunity can have two effects, depending on the gist of the message: First, when a message emphasized the individual benefit of indirect protection through the "herd", individuals' inclination to free-ride increased (H1). This was especially the case when the social COMMUNICATING HERD IMMUNITY IN VACCINE ADVOCACY 13 benefit of herd immunity was not communicated. Second, communicating the social benefit did not result in a general increase in vaccination intentions (contradicting H2). However, communicating the social benefit reduced free-riding and also had the potential to increase vaccination intentions when the costs of vaccinating are perceived as low. Thus, depending on which implication of herd immunity was made salient, vaccination intentions differed.
The lacking overall positive effect of communicated social benefit along with the obtained free-riding effect pose the question whether the communication of herd immunity is advisable at all. Strong emphasis on the social benefit, however, still seems advisable: even if it might not have an overall positive effect, it might at least prevent free-riding.
This becomes even more clear when we consider that many cues in the decision structure may invite free-riding: recent game-theoretic models of vaccination uptake have shown that the level of vaccination may decrease dramatically and fall below the social optimum if the expected costs of vaccination increase (e.g. due to a vaccine scare or anti-vaccination activism; Bhattacharyya & Bauch, 2010) or if the costs of the disease decrease (Jansen et al., 2003) . This occurs mainly because of free-riding on the immunized herd (e.g., Bauch & Earn, 2004 , Galvani, Reluga, & Chapman, 2007 Manfredi et al., 2010) . Furthermore, individuals are sensitive to different levels of immunity in the population if these are varied in a withinsubjects' setting : the more people were vaccinated, the less likely participants were to vaccinate themselves. Our results contribute to this literature by showing that quite subtle communications are also sufficient to suggest a free-riding opportunity. Again, this implies that strategies that prevent free-riding are needed. The current results suggest that appealing to prosocial motives might be such a strategy to reduce free-riding tendencies (see also Shim et al., 2012) .
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As previous research focused particularly on the negative effect of indirect protection through herd immunity (free-riding; e.g., Bauch & Earn, 2004 ), more scientific attention should be directed to its positive effect (i.e. prosocial behavior), in order to assess the boundary conditions under which the communication of the social benefit of vaccination does increase vaccine intentions (for instance, as in the present experiment, under low perceived costs of vaccination; or when the risk for the self is low as shown by Vietri et al., 2012) . This becomes particularly important if the direct effect of vaccination is very small or even absent and the indirect effect has important consequences for eradicating a disease (as in the most extreme case of malaria control; Carter, Mendis, Miller, Molyneux, & Saul, 2000) .
Limitations and Further Research
A number of possible limitations to the results should be noted. First, the hypothetical scenario and the self-report data (intentions) might limit the external validity of the results.
Additionally, online-experiments may be subject to self-selection bias. Indeed, the participants in our sample were typically well educated. However, including education in the analyses did not affect the pattern of results. Moreover, the present study tests hypotheses derived from a general game theoretical model. We do not assume different relations between utility functions for individuals with different levels of education. We therefore conclude that external validity of the results is given even though the sample might be skewed towards higher educated participants.
Further, we neither manipulated nor measured the individual perception of vaccine coverage and could therefore not test its impact on perceived costs of the disease. This should be a next step in further research. For instance, an experimental public goods setting of vaccination (see Chapman et al., 2012) e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr Gächter, & Fischbacher, 2001; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) .
Moreover, in social psychology there is evidence that prosocial behavior is more likely when uncontrollable factors created the situation of need (Weiner, 1980) . Thus, if it is communicated that others are explicitly not able to protect themselves, the communicated social benefit of herd immunity should have a larger effect.
Similarly, the way in which costs were manipulated represents only one out of several possibilities. As said before, costs accrue due to time, money, side effects, inconvenience, etc.
Future studies should use different approaches to manipulate costs. The perception or fear of potential side effects (such as elicited in vaccine scares) decreases vaccination intentions and are among the most prominent reasons against vaccination (Betsch, Renkewitz, Betsch, & Ulshöfer, 2010; Brown et al., 2010a Brown et al., , 2010b . Thus, it is possible that if costs are manipulated via potential side effects of the vaccine, the obtained effects may be stronger.
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Practical Implications
Overall, it seems advisable to stress vaccination's social benefit in vaccine advocacy.
This is especially the case if the concept of herd immunity is communicated to the public, such as during the process of eradicating diseases, e.g. the measles and rubella in Europe until 2015 (Christie & Gay, 2011) . If the indirect effects of vaccination become obvious, free-riding might increase, as vaccine coverage is usually already high (but not high enough). Therefore, stressing the social benefit may help to reach critical vaccination levels in order to eradicate diseases.
Protection of others is especially important in contexts with highly vulnerable individuals, such as immunocompromised patients in a hospital. For this reason, the WHO recommends vaccination against influenza for health care personnel (HCP). Despite the availability of an effective and well-tolerated vaccine, low seasonal and pandemic influenza vaccine acceptance among HCP is a major problem detailed in many studies from all over of the world (Salgado, Giannetta, Hayden & Farr, 2004; Talbot et al., 2010) . The perception of vaccination risks in addition to other expected vaccination costs are major reasons why HCP do not get vaccinated against influenza (Betsch & Wicker, 2012; Wicker, Rabenau, Doerr & Allwinn, 2009) . One could speculate that HCP may generally be more prosocially oriented (e.g., Van Lange, 1999) . Thus, building on the idea of tailoring health messages (Noar, Benac & Harris, 2007) , appeals to the social benefit of vaccination could be a viable strategy to increase HCP's vaccination rates.
Conclusions
We conclude that the social benefits of vaccination need to be explicitly communicated if the individual decisions are meant to consider public health benefits. Even if it does not generally raise vaccination intentions, it can prevent free-riding and has the potential to increase while potential vaccination side-effects were rather moderate. As a consequence, 100 participants perceived a higher risk of vaccination than of the disease, while the majority of 237 participants perceived higher disease than vaccination risks;
for 5 participants the costs of disease were equal to the costs of vaccination.
2 Strictly speaking, the pre-conditions for considering vaccination as a social dilemma are only given for those participants who perceived the costs (risk) of the vaccination to be higher than the costs (risk) of the disease (see Figure 1 ). In support of this, two separate analyses showed that the effects were indeed 
